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The Impact of Adaptation on the Stability of International
Environmental Agreements
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Abstract
We examine the stability of international environmental agreements that include clauses
pertaining to both adaptation and mitigation measures. We assume that adaptation requires
a prior irreversible investment and presents the characteristics of a private good by reducing
a country’s vulnerability to the impact of pollution, while mitigation policies produce a public
good by reducing the total amount of pollution.
Using a stylized model, we show that adaptive measures can be used strategically and
that their inclusion in environmental agreements enhances agreement stability and can even
lead to full cooperation. We examine the robustness of agreements including both adaptation
and mitigation measures against renegotiation. Finally, we evaluate how including adaptive
measures for climate change in international environmental agreements affects welfare and
overall pollution.
Keywords: Adaptation, Climate change, Mitigation, Strategy, Stability.
1 Introduction
It is increasingly recognized that there are two different ways of responding to climate change and
its impacts: reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and investing in adaptive measures.1 At the
international level, this has been acknowledged at several United Nations conferences on climate
change (Cancun 2010, Durban 2011, Doha 2012, Paris 2015) and in the series of Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment reports published over time (Third Assessment Report
2001, Fourth Assessment Report 2007, Fifth Assessment Report 2014). However, in the discussions
on climate change, the ambiguous effects of adaptation are often raised.
Following on the statement in the Third Assessment Report, “Adaptation is a necessary strategy
at all scales to complement climate change mitigation efforts,”2 our aim in this paper is to study the
consequences of including resolutions on adaptive measures in the negotiation of an International
Environmental Agreement (IEA) aiming at reducing GHG emissions. In particular, we investigate
the case of adaptive measures involving long-term planning, long-lived investments, and some degree
of irreversibility. For this kind of investments, countries need to act in anticipation of mitigation
policies. Examples of such adaptive measures are infrastructures for water management (dams,
reservoirs, dykes, storm surge barriers) or transportation (ports or bridges), urbanization plans
1Adaptation is defined in the Glossary of the IPCC (2014, p.118) by “The process of adjustment to actual or
expected climate and its effects.”
2https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=10
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(urban density, parks), the development of resistant crops, etc. (Hallegatte, 2009). The sequential
relation between adaptation and mitigation decisions also stems from the fact that humans have
been constantly adapting to climate, climate variability, and extreme weather events, and adaptive
measures have always been decided individualistically.3
In this context, we analyze three types (M, A and C ) of agreements, differing in the scope of
the cooperation.4 The motivation for analyzing various agreement types lies in the evolution of
the focus of international negotiations on climate change. With the exception of a few articles
referring to the need of adaptation to climate change (Art. 4.1(b) and (e)5), the main aim of
the UNFCCC (Rio, 1992) was to stabilize the emissions of GHGs. During the 1990s, most of the
negotiations focused solely on mitigation and they resulted in the Kyoto Protocol (1997). This is
the rationale behind the first type of agreement, the M-agreement, where signatory countries agree
to coordinate only their mitigation policies, while each country decides on its adaptation policy
individually. Over time, countries realized the importance of including the issue of adaptation in
the international negotiations on climate change; the first sign of this appeared in 2001 with the
Marrakech Accords, followed, in 2002, by the Delhi Declaration, up to the Paris Agreement in
2015. This motivates the analysis of a second type of agreement, the C-agreement, where signatory
countries agree to coordinate both their adaptation and mitigation policies. Finally, in light of
the difficulties of reaching a large participation of countries to coordinate their mitigation levels,
we propose a third type of agreement, not observed in reality yet, but hypothetical and worthy of
consideration. In an A-agreement, signatory countries agree to coordinate only their adaptation
policies, while each country decides on its mitigation policy individually.
The problem contemplated here is modelled as a multi-stage game in the context of pollution
emissions and vulnerability to climate change. However, the basic model is general and could apply
to any agreement involving a reduction in economic activity (mitigation) and/or private measures
decreasing vulnerability (adaptation) that require a prior irreversible investment. The same model
has been used in Breton & Sbragia (2017) to examine, in a C-agreement setting with and without
signatory leadership, how different timings of decisions about adaptation and mitigation impact on
environmental costs and levels of effort. The analysis is developed for any number of parties to the
agreement, without addressing the issue of membership stability. One of the main results of that
paper is that adaptive measures can play a strategic role so that countries can increase adaptation
to reduce their mitigation effort, which is shown to be globally inefficient.6
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we study the impact of including adaptive
measures on IEA stability. Second, we assess the economic and environmental consequences of
including such measures in IEAs. In both cases, we specifically consider adaptive measures that
require prior commitments and are decided before mitigation levels.
3Examples of countries that invested in adaptive measures before deciding on their mitigation levels are:
Bangladesh and its investment in coastal forest afforestation as a way to reduce its vulnerability to cyclones and
storm surges since 1966 (Islam & Rahman 2015); the Netherlands with the Delta Works (1954 -1997) as a response
to the 1953 North Sea flood (VanKoningsveld et al. 2008); the Egyptian Aswan High Dam (1960-1970) to protect
from floods and droughts like the ones in 1972–73 and 1983–87 that devastated East and West Africa (Goldenman
1990).
4A similar setting is considered in Zehaie (2009) and in Bayramoglu et al. (2016), where two possibilities are
analyzed, a M-agreement (called semi-cooperation in Zehaie 2009) and a M+A- (or C-) agreement.
5Article 4.1 (e) of the UNFCCC states that “All parties... shall cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the
impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management,
water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected
by drought and desertification, as well as floods.”
6A similar result is obtained in Heuson et al. (2015) in a non-cooperative setting.
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With respect to our first contribution, other publications that have considered the effects of
adaptive investments on membership in IEAs include Marrouch and Chaudhuri (2011), Masoudi
& Zaccour (2016), Lazkano et al. (2016), Masoudi & Zaccour (2017), Benchekroun et al. (2017),
and Bayramoglu et al. (2018). With the exception of Masoudi & Zaccour (2017), all assume that
adaptive measures are decided simultaneously with mitigation decisions.
Marrouch and Chaudhuri (2011) considers an environmental damage cost that is bilinear in
total emissions and adaptation; by assuming that signatory countries act as leaders, the authors
show that large stable coalitions can be reached and that the level of total emissions can be below
the non-cooperative level. Bayramoglu et al. (2018) assumes that adaptation contributes to the
welfare both directly and in relation to the level of total emissions; the authors show that in that case
adaptation can make countries’ mitigation levels strategic complements and this allows countries
to form larger stable agreements. Lazkano et al. (2016) studies the stability of an IEA in a generic
model where countries are assumed to be asymmetric in adaptation cost parameters. The authors
show that when the environmental damage cost is linear, asymmetry does not change the standard
small-size coalition result for stable IEAs. However, when damage cost is quadratic, cross-country
differences in adaptation may encourage participation in an IEA. In a quadratic environmental
cost context, the main feature of Masoudi & Zaccour (2016) is that adaptation has a “public good
flavour,” in that the benefits of adaptive measures are shared by the signatory countries and can
spill over to all countries. The authors find that for some parameter values, stable IEAs can form
with a significant number of countries. Finally, Benchekroun et al. (2017) also uses a quadratic
model for the environmental cost, where it is assumed that the welfare of non-signatory countries
is reduced by an extra fixed cost as a penalty for not signing the agreement. The presence of this
fixed cost drives the result of possible large coalitions.
These publications indicate that, when adaptation is decided simultaneously with mitigation
levels, it may have a positive effect on the stability of IEAs; however, all the above-mentioned
papers make use of specific features that enhance coalition stability, such as leadership, punishments,
asymmetry or spillovers.
Compared to the cited literature, in this paper, we adopt a different timing of decisions between
adaptation and mitigation: we consider situations where adaptation requires a prior commitment,
so that we focus exclusively on the impact of the strategic role of private investments on coalition
stability. This approach is similar to the one presented in Masoudi & Zaccour (2017), which
considers an A-agreement where adaptation with a public good flavour requires a commitment
prior to mitigation decisions. In this setting, the authors find that for some parameter values, large
stable IEAs can form. Our private-adaptation version of an A-agreement confirms the results found
in Masoudi & Zaccour (2017), implying that knowledge spillovers are not necessary for a large
coalition on adaptation to form.
Moreover, we are able to conclude that, in terms of participation size, the M-agreement is the
one that performs worst, while the C- and the A-agreements can reach any size, including full
cooperation. Furthermore, we show that a C-agreement is however not renegotiation-proof.
Another consequence of the prior-commitment assumption is the fact that, because expenditures
on environmental policies differ among signatory and non-signatory countries, countries may differ
in their level of adaptation in the last stage of the game wherein mitigation levels are decided. This
asymmetrical feature links our paper to another stream of the literature on IEAs that analyzes the
impact of some sort of asymmetry among countries on the size of a stable agreement. Examples of
such investigations are Fuentes-Albero & Rubio (2010), Glanemann (2012), and Pavlova & de Zeeuw
(2013). These analyses all find that, in stylized models without transfers, asymmetry in a single
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aspect is not sufficient to change the usual small-size-coalition result; to achieve large coalitions,
countries have to be different in more than one respect, and the asymmetries among countries have
to be strong. In our setting, the asymmetry of countries arises from adaptation decisions that are
endogenous to the game itself. Our model with endogenous asymmetry confirms the result of the
exogenous-asymmetry literature: we find that the pessimistic small-coalition result persists in the
mitigation game when countries differ in their adaptation levels.
The second contribution of our paper is its examination of the economic and environmental
implications of including adaptive measures in environmental agreement. We find that when adap-
tation is regulated by an agreement (A- or C-agreement) and a stable coalition size is reached, the
total adaptation expenditures, emissions and environmental costs are lower than when there is no
agreement and countries adapt in their own individual way (M-agreement). This result has impor-
tant policy implications as it provides support for the current trend in international negotiations
on climate change.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly recalls the prior-commitment
model of Breton & Sbragia (2017). Sections 3 and 4 characterize equilibrium environmental policies
in the presence of various types of IEAs involving a subset of countries, and Section 5 discusses
the membership stability of these agreements. Section 6 reports on the welfare impact of including
adaptive measures in IEAs. Section 7 supplies a conclusion.
2 Model
We consider n symmetric countries whose production activities create economic value but also
pollution emissions as a by-product. Countries have two mechanisms at their disposal that can be
used to respond to the adverse consequences of pollution emissions. The first, called adaptation,
involves investing in private7 measures to counterbalance the negative effects of climate change (for
instance, developing a crop variety that resists droughts). As indicated in the IPCC (2014) Glossary,
“In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.”
The effect of adaptation is thus a reduction in the country’s vulnerability to pollution, described as
vj = E − aj
where E is the total emissions by countries, and aj ∈ [0, E] measures the reduction in vulnerability
resulting from adaptive measures.8 The cost of adaptation for country j is an increasing convex
function of aj , assumed quadratic, that is,
Aj(aj) =
γA
2
a2j
where γA > 0 is the adaptation cost coefficient.
The second environmental policy is called mitigation and it consists of any means (e.g., filters)
aimed at curtailing the pollution emissions of country j, denoted by ej ; we normalize the production
7This is a common perspective in the literature on climate change-mitigation-adaptation, see for instance Mar-
rouch & Chaudhuri (2011), Lazkano et al. (2016) or Benchekroun et al. (2017). Only Masoudi & Zaccour (2016,
2017) consider adaptation with a “public good flavour”. By assuming that adaptation to climate change is essen-
tially private, we imply that the consequences of the adaptive measures can be excluded and enjoyed primarily by
their instigator. For example, the sole beneficiary of the decision by a country to build a desalinization plant will
be the country itself.
8Note that aj is not a reduction of total pollution; it represents a reduction of the impact of total pollution on
country j.
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technology in such a way that the optimal emissions of country j when there is no environmental
concern is equal to 1, so that mitigation is represented by the variable
mj = 1− ej ,
where mj ∈ [0, 1] is the reduction in the country’s emissions with respect to the base level of 1. The
total pollution from all countries is then given by
E =
n∑
j=1
(1−mj) .
The cost of mitigation for country j is an increasing convex function of mj , assumed quadratic,
that is,
Mj(mj) =
γM
2
m2j
where γM > 0 is the mitigation cost coefficient.
Global pollution reduces each country’s welfare (e.g., causes losses in productivity) and this
damage function is increasing and convex in the country’s environmental vulnerability, that is,
Dj(vj) =
γD
2
v2j
where γD > 0 is the environmental sensitivity coefficient. Note that, under the restriction aj ∈
[0, E], the damage function is increasing in total emissions and decreasing in adaptation.
The overall environmental cost for a representative country j is thus given by
zj =
γD
2
(E − aj)2 + γM
2
m2j +
γA
2
a2j .
We normalize the cost function by dividing it by the constant γM , yielding an equivalent cost
function involving two parameters
cj =
zj
γM
=
ω
2
(E − aj)2 + 1
2
m2j +
η
2
a2j
where E ≡ ∑ni=1 (1−mi), ω ≡ γDγM and η ≡ γAγM . The objective of country j is to choose the
mitigation and adaptation levels that minimize the global environmental cost cj .
This stylized model includes the three sources of costs commonly used in the climate change
literature, and is consistent with the usual assumptions about the behavior of these costs:
A′j > 0
A′′j ≥ 0
M ′j > 0
M ′′j ≥ 0
∂
∂EDj > 0,
∂
∂aj
Dj < 0
∂2
∂E2Dj > 0,
∂2
∂a2j
Dj ≥ 0
∂2
∂E∂aj
Dj =
∂2
∂aj∂E
Dj ≤ 0.
It is straightforward to check that, for this model, the cost function of an individual country, given
the environmental strategies of the other countries, is strictly convex. Also note that the restriction
0 ≤ aj ≤ E is always satisfied in equilibrium, as shown in Breton & Sbragia (2017). This specific
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form has been used in Breton & Sbragia (2017), Benchekroun et al. (2017) and Masoudi & Zaccour
(2016, 2017).9
In this paper, we study the effects of including adaptive investments in the negotiation of an
IEA aiming to reduce pollution emissions, when commitments to climate-change-adaptive measures
are made before emission-mitigation decisions. This is modelled as a multi-stage game and solved
by backward recursion. We look for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the multi-stage game
with full information. The sequence of moves is represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Timeline of the three-stage game.
In the first stage, countries play a “membership” game. Countries that subscribe to the agree-
ment are called signatories and their decisions are made in the interest of all members, that is, they
minimize their aggregate total environmental cost. Countries that do not subscribe to the agree-
ment are called non signatories or individualistic countries and their decisions are driven by their
individual interest. We denote by S the set of signatory countries and by I the set of individualistic
(non-signatory) countries, where |S| = N , |I| = M and N +M = n.
In the second stage, countries play an “adaptation” game, that is, they decide how much they
will invest in measures to counteract the adverse effects of climate change.
In the third stage, countries play a “mitigation” game, that is, they decide how much effort they
will dedicate to curtailing their emissions.
We will distinguish between three contrasting cases concerning the scope of the environmental
agreement. In the first case (M-agreement), signatories only agree to coordinate their mitigation
policies; in the second case (A-agreement), signatories only agree to coordinate their adaptation
policies; in the third case (C-agreement), signatories agree to coordinate both their adaptation and
9Other papers adopting stylized functional forms in the literature use slightly different assumptions. Buob and
Stephan (2011) uses a Cobb-Douglas formulation. Marrouch and Ray Chauduri (2011) and Farnham and Kennedy
(2015) use a bilinear damage function, which requires additional conditions on parameter values to ensure convex-
ity of the optimization problems.
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mitigation policies.
3 Equilibrium solution of the mitigation game
The mitigation stage is the last stage of the game. To solve it, we make no assumption on the
adaptation levels decided on in the preceding stages. Accordingly, we seek an equilibrium solution
to a mitigation game involving asymmetric countries, where each country j is characterized by
a parameter aj representing its prior investment in adaptive measures. We denote by mSj the
mitigation effort of a signatory country j, and by mIj the mitigation effort of a non-signatory
country j.
3.1 M-agreement and C-agreement
In both the M-agreement and the C-agreement cases, signatories coordinate their mitigation policies,
while non signatories decide individually. A non-signatory country j ∈ I solves
min
mj∈[0,1]
{
1
2
ω (Oj −mj − aj)2 + 1
2
m2j +
1
2
ηa2j
}
(1)
where Oj = n −
∑
i 6=jmi. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions for all j ∈ I
yield
mIj = ω (E − aj) for all j ∈ I.
The non signatories’ mitigation policy is a value proportional to their vulnerability vj = E − aj ,
where the coefficient ω is the ratio of the damage and mitigation costs parameters.
Signatory countries j ∈ S jointly solve
min
mj∈[0,1], j∈S
∑
j∈S
1
2
ω
(
OS −
∑
i∈S
mi − aj
)2
+
1
2
m2j +
1
2
ηa2j

where OS = n−
∑
i/∈Smi. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions yield
mSj = Nω (E − a¯S) for all j ∈ S,
where a¯S =
∑
i∈S ai
N is the average adaptation level of the signatories. We observe that the mit-
igation efforts of all signatories are the same, irrespective of their adaptation levels; moreover,
the signatories’ mitigation effort would be N times higher than that of a non signatory with an
adaptation level equal to a¯S .
The equilibrium solution of the mitigation game is readily obtained by solving for the total
emissions:
E = n−
∑
j∈S
Nω (E − a¯S)−
∑
j∈I
ω (E − aj)
yielding
E =
n+Mωa¯I +N
2ωa¯S
W1
(2)
W1 ≡ ω
(
M +N2
)
+ 1
mIj = ω (E − aj) , j ∈ I (3)
mSj = mS = Nω (E − a¯S) , j ∈ S (4)
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where a¯I =
∑
i∈I ai
M is the average adaptation level of the non signatories.
3.2 A-agreement
In the A-agreement case, decisions about mitigation levels are not coordinated. All countries solve
the optimization problem (1), so that
mj = ω (E − aj) for j = 1, . . . , n. (5)
The equilibrium solution of the mitigation game is then obtained by solving for the total emissions:
E = n−
∑
j∈S
ω (E − aj)−
∑
j∈I
ω (E − aj)
yielding
E =
n+Mωa¯I +Nωa¯S
W2
(6)
W2 ≡ nω + 1
mIj = ω (E − aj) , j ∈ I (7)
mSj = ω (E − aj) , j ∈ S. (8)
3.3 Strategic role of adaptation
Note that in all three types of agreements, adaptation plays a strategic role in the mitigation game:
the mitigation level of a given country decreases with its own adaptation level while it increases
with the adaptation level of other countries (see Appendix 8.1).
As pointed out in Breton & Sbragia (2017), the strategic complementarity of decisions of different
countries is due to the prior commitment assumption, and is not present when adaptation and
mitigation decisions are taken simultaneously.
4 Equilibrium solution of the adaptation game
In the adaptation stage, to determine their investment in adaptation, countries take into account
the equilibrium solutions found for the mitigation game, i.e. (2)-(4) or (6)-(8).
The impact of a given country j’s adaptation on its total environmental cost can be expressed
as follows:
dcj
daj
= ω (E − aj)
(
dE
daj
− 1
)
+mj
dmj
daj
+ ηaj , (9)
where the first term corresponds to the impact on the damage cost and the second and third terms
correspond respectively to the impact on the mitigation and adaptation costs.
The mitigation level mj , the marginal impact of adaptation on total emissions
dE
daj
and the
marginal impact of adaptation on a country’s mitigation level
dmj
daj
differ according to the equilibrium
solution of the mitigation game. In all cases, 0 < dEdaj < 1 and
dmj
daj
< 0 so that the impact of a
country’s increase in adaptation is a decrease in that country’s damage and mitigation costs, and
an increase in the total emissions.
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Note also that mj ,
dE
daj
and
dmj
daj
differ according to the status (signatory or non signatory) of
countries, but have the same expression among countries of the same status. As a consequence, the
solution of the adaptation game is obtained by simultaneously solving
ω (E − aj)
(
dE
daj
− 1
)
+mj
dmj
daj
+ ηaj = 0, j = S, I (10)
where aS denotes the level of adaptation of signatory countries and aI denotes the level of adaptation
of non-signatory countries.
Consider a situation, outside of equilibrium, where all countries use the same level of adaptation
a, and therefore have the same vulnerability v = E − a. We wish to compare the impact of a
marginal change in adaptation on the total environmental cost of signatories and non signatories
in that situation. Call ∆ the difference in the marginal overall cost of adaptation between non
signatories and signatories, that is
∆ =
dcI
daI
− dcS
daS
.
When aI = aS = a, the value of ∆ is given by
∆ = ωv
(
dE
daI
− dE
daS
)
+mI
dmI
daI
−mS dmS
daS
. (11)
A positive difference ∆ means that, when countries use the same level of adaptation, the marginal
increase in total environmental cost due to a marginal increase in adaptation is higher for non
signatories than for signatories. Therefore, if, for instance, all countries use a level of adaptation
that minimizes the environmental cost of non signatories, the marginal impact of an increase in the
adaptation level of signatories is negative, a decrease in their total environmental cost, and as a
consequence the equilibrium adaptation level aS > aI . If the difference ∆ is negative, the reverse
is true and aS < aI in equilibrium. When adaptation plays a strategic role, signatories may adapt
more or less than non signatories at equilibrium, due to the relative importance of the impact of
adaptation on the damage and mitigation costs.
It is interesting to note that, if adaptation decisions were taken simultaneously with or after
mitigation decisions, the impact of adaptation on total emissions and on a country’s mitigation
level would be null, so that Equation (10) would become
−ωE + aj (η + ω) = 0 , j = I, S,
and ∆ would vanish. In equilibrium, all countries would then choose the same adaptation level,
proportional to the total pollution, in all types of agreements.
In what follows we compute the difference ∆ and the equilibrium solution of the adaptation
game for the three kinds of agreements. Furthermore, for comparison purposes, we also compute
the equilibrium solution of the adaptation game in the non-cooperative case when there exists
no environmental agreement, in the full-cooperation case, and in the case where adaptation and
mitigation decisions are taken simultaneously.
4.1 M-agreement
The M-agreement corresponds to the classical situation where signatories agree to coordinate their
mitigation levels, with the additional feature that all countries individually decide on their level of
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adaptation. The difference in the impact of adaptation on the environmental costs is explained by
the fact that signatories mitigate N times more than non signatories with the same vulnerability.
After replacing in (11) the corresponding expressions,10 we have
∆ = ωv
(
dE
daI
− dE
daS
)
+mI
dmI
daI
−mS dmS
daS
= ωv
(
ω
W1
− Nω
W1
)
− vω2W1 − ω
W1
+ vω2N2
W1 −Nω
W1
= −vω2N − 1
W1
+ vω2 (N − 1)
(
N + 1 + ω
(
(N + 1) (M − 1) +N3)
W1
)
= vω2 (N − 1) N + ω
(
(N + 1) (M − 1) +N3)
W1
> 0.
It is immediate to see that 0 < dEdaI <
dE
daS
, that is, an increase in adaptation increases the total
emissions of signatories more than those of the non signatories. In the same way, 0 > mI
dmI
daI
>
mS
dmS
daS
, that is, an increase in adaptation decreases the mitigation cost of signatories more than
that of non signatories. Since ∆ > 0, in the M-agreement case, signatory countries will adapt
more than non signatories in equilibrium. Adaptation is more valuable for the signatory countries
because an increase in adaptation is able to reduce the signatory mitigation effort at a level that
offsets the greater increase in total emissions compared to non signatories. The term that drives
the result is mS
dmS
daS
.
The reaction function and equilibrium solutions solving (10) are then given by:
aI(a¯S) =
ω (W1 − ω) (ω + 1)
(
n+N2ωa¯S
)
K1
aS(a¯I) =
ω
(
N2ω + 1
)
(n+Mωa¯I) (W1 −Nω)
K2
aI =
nωW1 (ω + 1) (ω −W1)
(
Nω2
(
N2ω + 1
)−W1 (η + ω +N2ω2))
K1K2 −MN2ω4 (N2ω + 1) (ω + 1) (W1 − ω) (W1 −Nω) (12)
aS =
nω
(
N2ω + 1
)
(W1 −Nω)W1
(
W1
(
η + ω + ω2
)− ω2 (ω + 1))
K1K2 −MN2ω4 (N2ω + 1) (ω + 1) (W1 − ω) (W1 −Nω) (13)
K1 = W
2
1
(
η + ω + ω2
)
+ ω2 (ω + 1) (Mω −W1 (M + 1))
K2 = W
2
1
(
η + ω +N2ω2
)
+ ω2N
(
N2ω + 1
) (
N2ω −W1 (N + 1)
)
aS − aI =
nω2ηW 21 (N − 1)
(
N + ω
(
(N + 1) (M − 1) +N3))
K1K2 −MN2ω4 (ω + 1) (N2ω + 1) (W1 − ω) (W1 −Nω) > 0.
As indicated by the reaction functions, in the M-agreement case, adaptation levels of signatory
and non-signatory countries are strategic complements in the adaptation game.
10See Appendix 8.2.
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4.2 A-agreement
In the case of an agreement exclusively on adaptation measures, the mitigation level of all countries
is mj = ωE − ωaj , as indicated in (7)-(8). After replacing in (11) the corresponding expressions,11
we have
∆ = ωv
(
dE
daI
− dE
daS
)
+mI
dmI
daI
−mS dmS
daS
= −vω2N − 1
W2
− vω3N − 1
W2
= −vω2 (ω + 1) N − 1
W2
< 0.
In the A-agreement case, signatory countries will adapt less than non signatories in equilibrium.
The term that drives the result is dEdaS . Because they move collectively, an increase in the adaptation
of signatories has a larger impact on total emissions than that of non signatories. As a consequence,
at equal vulnerability, an increase in adaptation by signatories results in a higher increase of both
their damage and mitigation costs, compared to non signatories.
The reaction function and equilibrium solutions solving (10) are given by:
aI(a¯S) =
ω (ω + 1) (n+Nωa¯S) (W2 − ω)
K3
aS(a¯I) =
ω (ω + 1) (n+Mωa¯I) (W2 −Nω)
K4
aI =
nωW2 (ω + 1) (W2 − ω)
(
ω2 (−N +Mω + 1) +W2 (η + ω)
)
K3K4 −MNω4 (ω + 1)2 (Mω + 1) (W2 − ω)
(14)
aS =
nωW2 (ω + 1)
(
ω3 (n− 1) +W2 (η + ω)
)
(Mω + 1)
K3K4 −MNω4 (ω + 1)2 (W2 − ω) (Mω + 1)
(15)
K3 = W
2
2
(
η + ω + ω2
)− ω2 (ω + 1) (W2 (M + 1)−Mω)
K4 = W
2
2
(
η + ω + ω2
)− ω2N (ω + 1) (2W2 −Nω) .
aS − aI = − nω
2 (ω + 1)W 22 η (N − 1)
K3K4 −MN (ω + 1)2 (Mω + 1) (W2 − ω)
< 0.
In the A-agreement case, adaptation levels of signatory and non-signatory countries are strategic
complements in the adaptation game.
4.3 C-agreement
In the case of a C-agreement, non signatories individually decide on their level of adaptation,
while signatories coordinate their decision. Moreover, in the emission-game equilibrium, signatories
mitigate N times more than non signatories for the same level of vulnerability. Replacing in (11)
11See Appendix 8.2.
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the corresponding expressions,12 we then have
∆ = ωv
(
ω
W1
− ωN
2
W1
)
+ ωvω
ω −W1
W1
−NωvNω−W1 +N
2ω
W1
= −vω2 (N − 1) N + 1
W1
+ vω2 (N − 1) (N + 1) ω (M − 1) + 1
W1
= vω3 (N − 1) (N + 1) M − 1
W1
> 0.
In the C-agreement case, signatory countries will adapt more than non signatories in equilibrium.
As in the M-agreement case, this is due to the large impact of adaptation on the mitigation cost,
mS
dmS
daS
. Adaptation is more valuable for the signatory countries because, at the same adaptation
level, an increase in adaptation reduces the signatories’ mitigation cost at a level that offsets the
greater increase in damage cost compared to non signatories.
The reaction function and equilibrium solution solving (10) are given by:
aI(a¯S) =
ω (ω + 1)
(
n+N2ωa¯S
)
(W1 − ω)
K5
aS(a¯I) =
ω
(
N2ω + 1
)
(Mω + 1) (n+Mωa¯I)
K6
aI =
nωW1 (ω + 1)
(
W1 (η + ω) +MN
2ω3
)
(W1 − ω)
K5K6 −MN2ω4 (ω + 1) (N2ω + 1) (W1 − ω) (Mω + 1) (16)
aS =
nωW1
(
N2ω + 1
)
(Mω + 1)
(
ω3
(
M +N2 − 1)+W1 (η + ω))
K5K6 −MN2ω4 (ω + 1) (N2ω + 1) (W1 − ω) (Mω + 1) (17)
K5 = W
2
1
(
η + ω + ω2
)− ω2 (ω + 1) (W1 (M + 1)−Mω)
K6 = W
2
1
(
η + ω +N2ω2
)−N2ω2 (N2ω + 1) (2Mω +N2ω + 2) .
aS − aI = nηω
3W 21 (N − 1) (N + 1) (M − 1)
K5K6 −MN2ω4 (ω + 1) (N2ω + 1) (W1 − ω) (Mω + 1) > 0.
In the C-agreement case, as in the two other cases, adaptation levels of signatory and non-
signatory countries are strategic complements in the adaptation game.
4.4 Comparison cases
In this section, we develop three more cases that are useful for subsequent comparisons. The
first one is the no-cooperation case, that corresponds to the situation where all countries decide
individualistically on both their adaptation and mitigation efforts. The equilibrium solution of the
adaptation game is obtained by setting N = 1 and M = n− 1 in the solution of the A-agreement.
The equilibrium adaptation level is then given by:
aj =
nω (ω + 1) (−ω + nω + 1)
W 22 (η + ω)− nω2W2 + ω3 (n− 1)
, j = 1, . . . , n. (18)
12See Appendix 8.2.
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The second case is full-cooperation, where all countries jointly decide on both their adaptation
and mitigation effort. The solution of the adaptation game is retrieved by using N = n countries
in the C-agreement equilibrium. The equilibrium adaptation level is then given by:
aj =
nω
η + ω + n2ηω
, j = 1, . . . , n. (19)
Finally, we report the equilibrium solution of the adaptation game for a C-agreement when
decisions about adaptation and mitigation are made simultaneously. This is taken from Breton and
Sbragia (2017):
aS = aI = ω
E
η + ω
mS = NωE
η
η + ω
mI = ωE
η
η + ω
E = n
η + ω
W3
W3 = η + ω + ηω
(
M +N2
)
.
5 Solution of the membership game
To solve the membership game, we adopt the non-cooperative point of view, which assumes that
agreements must be self-enforcing. Accordingly, following d’Aspremont et al. (1983), an equilibrium
is defined by two conditions: the internal stability, which implies that signatories have no incentive
to leave the agreement, and the external stability, which implies that non signatories have no
incentive to join the agreement.
Let cS (N) and cI (N) represent the equilibrium costs for a signatory and a non-signatory coun-
try, respectively, when the number of signatories is N :
cS (N) =
1
2
ω (E − aS)2 + 1
2
m2S +
1
2
ηa2S
cI (N) =
1
2
ω (E − aI)2 + 1
2
m2I +
1
2
ηa2I
where E, aS , aI , mS and mI are given, as a function of N , by the equilibrium solutions in the sub-
sequent stages of the game. The internal and external stability conditions defining the equilibrium
of the membership game are then, respectively,
cS (N)− cI (N − 1) ≤ 0
cS (N + 1)− cI (N) ≥ 0.
5.1 M-agreement
We first consider the general problem of the stability of an agreement between N countries to
cooperate on mitigation policies, without any assumption on their respective adaptation levels.
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The equilibrium solution of the mitigation game involving N signatories where each country is
characterized by a level aj of adaptation is, according to (2)-(4),
E1 =
n+Mωa¯I +N
2ωa¯S
ωN2 +Mω + 1
mIj1 = ω (E1 − aj) , j ∈ I
mSj1 = Nω (E1 − a¯S) , j ∈ S.
The equilibrium solution of the mitigation game involving N − 1 signatories where Country i
defects from the agreement then corresponds to
E2 =
n+Mωa¯I + ωai + (N − 1)ω (NaS − ai)
ω (N − 1)2 + (M + 1)ω + 1
mi = ω (E2 − ai)
mIj2 = ω (E2 − aj) , j ∈ I
mSj2 = Nω
(
E2 − Na¯S − ai
N − 1
)
, j ∈ S\i.
According to its decision to defect or not, the total environmental cost for Country i is then, as
a function of N ,
cSi (N) =
1
2
ω (E1 − ai)2 + 1
2
N2ω2 (E1 − a¯S)2 + 1
2
ηa2i (20)
cIi (N − 1) =
1
2
ω (E2 − ai)2 + 1
2
ω2 (E2 − ai)2 + 1
2
ηa2i (21)
and the internal stability condition for a given N is then cSi (N)− cIi (N − 1) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ S.
Proposition 1 When adaptation levels of all countries are arbitrary, the maximum size of a stable
coalition of signatory countries in the mitigation game is two.
Proof. See Appendix 8.3.
When aj = 0 for all countries, i.e. nobody adapts, we retrieve the well known “pessimistic”
result for agreements on mitigation policies involving symmetrical countries.
Proposition 1 indicates that neither adaptation nor asymmetry in countries’ vulnerability to
global pollution help in achieving coordination in mitigation policies: for arbitrary adaptation
levels, the small-coalition result for agreements on mitigation policies holds.
According to the sequence presented in Figure 1, the M-agreement is signed before countries
decide on their adaptation levels, that is, the membership game is played by countries anticipating
the equilibrium solution of the adaptation game (12)-(13). Proposition 1 establishes that the
maximum number of signatories of a M-agreement is then two.13
Note that Proposition 1 also applies to a M-agreement when adaptation is decided simultane-
ously with, or after mitigation. This is the result found in Benchekroun et al. (2017) when the
fixed cost paid by countries for not participating in the agreement is set to 0.
13Proposition 1 would also apply to a case where countries invest in adaptive measures and then sign an agree-
ment to cooperate on their mitigation levels, that is, the membership game is played by countries having already
invested in adaptation at arbitrary levels. Again, the maximum coalition size would be 2.
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Figure 2: Size of the stable coalition for an A-agreement as a function of γDγM
(left panel) and γDγA
(right panel). The total number of countries is n = 100.
5.2 A-agreement
On the other hand, for A-agreements, stable equilibrium solutions with a significant number of
signatories may be obtained. As an illustration, Figures 2 and 3 report the solutions of the mem-
bership game when adaptation levels are given by (14)-(15) and mitigation levels by (7)-(8), for
a variety of parameter values, for n = 100 and for n = 50.14 Numerical experiments show that
equilibrium total cost functions of both types of countries are decreasing and concave with respect
to the number of signatories, so that when an internally and externally stable coalition exists, it is
unique. Figures 2 and 3 plot the size of the stable coalition as a function of γDγM
= ω and γDγA
= ωη
(the corresponding numerical results are provided in Appendix 8.4). We observe that the behavior
of the solutions of the membership game is qualitatively similar for n = 100 and n = 50. We find
that full cooperation can be achieved for some parameter values, and that the size of the stable
coalition is increasing with ω and decreasing with η. We conclude that A-agreements, where signa-
tories agree to coordinate their adaptation levels, are likely to include a large number of countries
when the environmental damage cost is relatively high with respect to the cost of adaptation and
of mitigation.
It is interesting to point out that, while cooperation on mitigation can not be achieved due to
the fact that mitigation levels are strategic substitutes, this is not the case for adaptation decisions,
which are strategic complements in the adaptation game when adaptation plays a strategic role
in the subsequent mitigation game. When countries agree to coordinate their adaptation levels,
cooperation is possible, and full cooperation can even be achieved.
5.3 C-agreement
Figures 4 and 5 report the solutions of the membership game for a C-agreement, that is, when
adaptation levels are given by (16)-(17) and mitigation levels by (3)-(4), for the same set of param-
eter values as those used in the preceding section (corresponding numerical results are provided in
Appendix 8.4). As for the A-agreement case, large coalitions can form, and full cooperation can
be achieved for some sets of parameter values. We observe that the size of a stable coalition in a
14The combinations of values used in our numerical experiments span the space of parameter values yielding
interior solutions. Extensive simulations show that reported results are robust to n and to the range for ω and η.
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Figure 3: Size of the stable coalition for an A-agreement as a function of γDγM
(left panel) and γDγA
(right panel). The total number of countries is n = 50.
C-agreement is increasing with ω and decreasing with η, but is never larger than in an A-agreement
for a given set of parameter values.
Figure 4: Size of the stable coalition for a C-agreement as a function of γDγM
(left panel) and γDγA
(right panel). The total number of countries is n = 100.
However, when adaptation investments are made before mitigation decisions, a drawback of
the C-agreement is that it is not renegotiation-proof. To show that this is the case, consider the
time line presented in Figure 6, where signatory players can reconsider their participation to the
agreement after investments in adaptive measures have become irreversible.
Corollary 2 When commitments to adaptive measures are made before mitigation decisions, agree-
ments to coordinate both adaptation and mitigation policies are not renegotiation-proof.
Proof. Assume that the set of parameter values is such that a coalition of N ≥ 3 countries is
internally and externally stable when costs are computed using the equilibrium solution (16)-(17)
and (3)-(4) corresponding to the C-agreement. Using Proposition 1, if a membership game were
played in the renegotiation step, the maximum size of a stable coalition would be 2 < N. As a
16
Figure 5: Size of the stable coalition for a C-agreement as a function of γDγM
(left panel) and γDγA
(right panel). The total number of countries is n = 50.
Figure 6: Sequence of decisions when players can defect from an agreement after adaptive mea-
sures have been implemented.
consequence, at least one signatory country will have an incentive to defect from the coalition in
the renegotiation step.
Knowing that a C-agreement is not renegotiation-proof, farsighted players solving the four-
stage game depicted in Figure 6 by backward induction should expect the agreement to break
down after investment in adaptive measures have become irreversible. If one assumes that the
equilibrium solution of the renegotiation step is N ′ = 1, the equilibrium solution of the four-stage
game corresponds to the solution obtained under an A-agreement.
Note that when adaptation and mitigation decisions are taken simultaneously, the issue of
renegotiation does not apply. The solution of the membership game in the C-agreement scenario
is then obtained by using Proposition 1, showing that the maximum size of a stable coalition is
two. In this case the arbitrary levels of adaptation are replaced by a common level for all players,
proportional to the total emissions. This is an interesting result, as it shows that when (private)
adaptive measures to the adverse consequences of climate change are negotiated simultaneously
with emissions reduction as part of an IEA, they do not change the well-known pessimistic result
that stable large-size coalitions cannot form.
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6 Economic and environmental implications of adaptive mea-
sures in IEAs
In this section, we evaluate the implications of incorporating adaptive policies into IEAs, by com-
paring the outcomes of various agreement types using two benchmark cases:
• the case where there is no agreement on environmental policies, where adaptation levels are
given by (18) and mitigation levels by (5);
• the full-cooperation case, where adaptation and mitigation levels are given respectively by
(19) and (4), with N = n.
6.1 Benefits of cooperation
We first provide an assessment of how far apart are the no-cooperation and the full cooperation
solutions for a variety of parameter values. Table 1 reports on the average adaptation level, total
emission and average total costs in the full-cooperation case, expressed as a percentage of the
corresponding values in the no-agreement case.
γD
γM
0.02 0.39 6.25 100 0.02 0.39 6.25 100 0.02 0.39 6.25 100
γD
γA
Average adaptation level Total emissions Average total cost
312.5 57 8.1 0.64 0.04 57 8.1 0.64 0.04 57 8.8 0.81 0.05
1250 84 24.8 2.10 0.13 84 24.8 2.10 0.13 84 25.4 2.24 0.15
5000 95 56.5 7.54 0.51 95 56.5 7.54 0.51 95 56.8 7.67 0.52
Table 1: Ratio of full-cooperation over no-cooperation outcomes (in %) for various parameter val-
ues, where n = 100.
As expected, adaptation levels, emissions and costs are all lower in the full-cooperation case than
in the no-cooperation case. Small reported values indicate that the no-cooperation outcomes are far
from the full-cooperation ones. We observe that the distance between these two solutions increases
with γDγM
and decreases with γDγA
.15 In other words, for a given value of the damage cost parameter
γD, the benefit from cooperation increases when the mitigation cost parameter γM decreases and/or
the adaptation cost parameter γA increases. It is interesting to observe by comparing these results
with those of Figures (2)-(5) that stable agreements involving adaptive measures (A-agreements
and C-agreements) are more likely to include a large number of countries when the benefit from
cooperation is high.
6.2 Three-stage game equilibrium outcome comparisons
Table 2 compares the equilibrium solutions against the benchmark solutions, for different parameter
values in the various types of agreements considered in this paper. It also includes the equilibrium
solution of a C-agreement when adaptation and mitigation decisions are taken simultaneously. The
comparison is made by evaluating, for each agreement type, the position λ of the solution (in
15Results obtained by varying the total number of countries n are qualitatively similar.
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terms of average adaptation level, total emissions and average cost) in the range separating the
cooperative and non-cooperative values, that is, the value of λ solving
V k = λV FC + (1− λ)V NC ,
where V k is the value of the outcome for scenario k and V FC and V NC are the values of the
outcome in the full-cooperation and no-cooperation solutions, respectively. A value of λ close to
1 means that the outcome is close to the full-cooperation solution. For all types of agreements,
outcomes are computed using the size of the stable coalition in the first-stage membership game.
For the C-agreement, we also report the outcome obtained when the coalition breaks down after
the investment in adaptive measures (C-agreement with defection). In all cases, λ ∈ [0, 1], that is,
average adaptation, total emissions and total environmental costs are never higher than what is
achieved when there is no agreement, nor lower than under full cooperation.
Examination of Table 2 shows that a M-agreement, or a C-agreement with simultaneous deci-
sions, do not help in significantly reducing emissions and environmental costs due to the impos-
sibility of achieving stability in coalitions with a significant size. However, agreements including
resolutions on adaptive measures can have a significant number of signatories, and this happens
specifically in cases where the non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes are very far apart. In
such cases, even a modest value of λ may represent a substantial improvement with respect to the
non-cooperative solution. This is illustrated in Figures 7 and 8 comparing the total environment
costs and the total pollution under the A- and C- agreements to the no-agreement case, and in
Figure 9 comparing the total pollution under the A- and C- agreements, for various combinations
of parameter values.
Figure 7: Reduction in total environmental cost, as a percentage of the no-cooperation solution
outcome, for various parameter values and n = 100.
6.3 Agreement design
From both an environmental and an economic standpoint, the results illustrated in Table 2 and
Figures 7-9 indicate that including adaptive measures in the scope of environmental agreements
may be advisable when these measures require irreversible investments prior to the implementation
of mitigation policies. In fact, the M-agreement does little better than no cooperation since the
largest possible size of a stable coalition is 2, and even such a small coalition can only be formed
when the damage costs are small relatively to the mitigation costs and the benefits of cooperation
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Figure 8: Reduction in total pollution, as a percentage of the no-cooperation solution outcome,
for various parameter values and n = 100.
Figure 9: Total pollution for various parameter values and n = 100.
are small. On the other hand, both the A- and the C- agreements can support large coalitions,
up to full cooperation. We find that including adaptation provisions in environmental agreements
is more likely to achieve important reductions in environmental costs and in total emissions when
the damage cost is relatively high with respect to the adaptation and mitigation costs. We also
find that, while the number of signatory countries of a stable C-agreement is never larger than
that of an A-agreement, a C-agreement still generally results in better outcomes in terms of total
cost and pollution than an A-agreement, even when the agreement breaks down after investment
in adaptive measures become irreversible. This is an important result since it shows that, from
both the economic and environmental points of view, including resolutions on adaptive measures
in an IEA is better than letting countries decide on adaptation policies in their own individual
way. Finally, since C-agreements are not renegotiation proof, designing agreements pertaining
exclusively to adaptive measures (A-agreements) may be worth considering since their effectiveness
is close to that of C-agreements. Recall that the equilibrium solution of the A-agreement game
can be interpreted as the solution of a game involving farsighted signatory players who account for
the fact that all signatory countries should defect from the agreement and fail to coordinate their
mitigation policies.
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6.4 Illustrative example
As an illustration, Table 3 provides a detailed comparison of the outcomes under various types of
agreements for a specific set of parameters.
In this particular scenario, the M-agreement coincides with the no-cooperation solution since
no stable coalition can form in the mitigation game. We observe that the no-cooperation and the
full-cooperation solutions differ significantly (emissions, adaptation levels and total cost under co-
operation are between 8% and 9% of the corresponding outcomes when countries do not coordinate
their policies). Adaptation plays an important role in that difference: while the cost of adaptation
represents 7.4% of the total environmental cost in the full-cooperation solution, it represents 99.8%
of the total cost in the no-cooperation solution.
An A-agreement involving 76 countries is stable. Under the A-agreement, signatories’ adaptation
levels are lower than those of non signatories; as a result, their adaptation cost is lower, but they
are more vulnerable to the total emissions and suffer a higher damage cost than non signatories.
Signatories’ mitigation level is 3.8 times that of non signatories. Even if the λ values are relatively
small at 0.168 (adaptation), 0.163 (emissions) and 0.293 (costs), with respect to the no-cooperation
case, an A-agreement results in a reduction of 15% of the average adaptation level and of the total
pollution, and in a reduction of 27% of the total environmental costs.
The number of signatories of a C-agreement is 66. Under the C-agreement, signatories’ adapta-
tion levels are higher than those of non signatories; as a result, their adaptation cost is higher, but
their damage cost is lower than that of non signatories. In the C-agreement, signatories’ mitigation
level is 6.5 times that of non signatories. The total environmental cost of all countries is lower in a
C-agreement than in an A-agreement. A C-agreement results in a reduction of 23% of the average
adaptation level and of the total pollution, and in a reduction of 39% of the total environmental
costs with respect to the no-cooperation case.
However, the C-agreement is not renegotiation-proof, and since coordination of mitigation poli-
cies in an IEA cannot be enforced, one should expect countries to defect after investments in
adaptive measures are committed to. In that case (C-agreement with defection), countries do not
coordinate their mitigation decisions, but since (former) signatories are less vulnerable to total
pollution than non signatories, their mitigation level is 80% of the non signatories’ mitigation level.
As a result, the total environmental cost of all countries is lower than under an A-agreement, but
higher than under a C-agreement where players do not defect. A C-agreement with defection results
in a reduction of 23% of the average adaptation level, a reduction of 22% of the total pollution, and
in a reduction of 38% of the total environmental costs with respect to the no-cooperation case.
Finally, as pointed out by Benchekroun et al. (2017), the inclusion of adaptive measures into
an IEA does increase the incentive to cooperate when adaptation and mitigation are decided si-
multaneously; however, as shown in Proposition 1, the maximum size of a stable coalition in that
case is two, so that the impact of introducing adaptive measures into an IEA is limited. This is
illustrated by the results provided in Table 3: for the set of parameters used in this example, there
is no stable M-agreement, but in the simultaneous case, a C-agreement between two countries would
be stable, where the two signatories’ mitigation level would be twice that of non signatories. We
observe that the outcome in terms of adaptation levels, total emissions and average costs is close
to the no-cooperation solution, resulting in a reduction of 2% of the average adaptation level and
total pollution, and in a reduction of 4% of the total environmental costs.
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7 Conclusion
The objective of the paper was to study the consequences of introducing resolutions on adaptive
measures into an IEA. We focused on the case of private adaptive solutions that require a prior
commitment with respect to emission-reduction decisions.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• When an IEA includes private adaptive investments settled prior to mitigation decisions,
stable coalitions with a significant number of signatories can be obtained, which is not the
case when adaptation and mitigation are decided simultaneously.
• The number of signatories in a stable agreement depends on the relative values of three cost
parameters. It is likely to be high when the adaptation and mitigation costs are relatively
low with respect to the environmental damage cost.
• Such combinations of cost parameters correspond to cases where the no-cooperation solution
is very far from the full-cooperation solution, so that the inclusion of adaptive measures in
IEAs in these cases can significantly enhance welfare.
• An IEA including private adaptive investment clauses results in less adaptive effort, less
global pollution and a smaller environmental cost, as compared to a situation where there is
no agreement on adaptation or mitigation.
• Stable A-agreements involve more signatories than C-agreements, but can nonetheless result
in outcomes that are further away from the full-cooperation solution. C-agreements are not
renegotiation-proof; a C-agreement with defection results in outcomes that are between the
outcomes of an A-agreement and a C-agreement.
• The number of signatories of an IEA involving only mitigation clauses cannot be larger than
two, irrespective of the adaptation levels of participating countries, and of the timing of the
adaptation decisions.
It is important to stress that the economic and environmental impact of including resolutions
on adaptive measures in IEAs is beneficial only in the case where adaptation requires a prior com-
mitment. When adaptation and mitigation measures are decided simultaneously, large coalitions
of more than two players cannot form.
Compared to the related literature, we showed that an endogenous asymmetry of the countries
provides results that are in line with the literature on IEA and asymmetric countries, and that
to have some positive effects on the stability of an IEA, we do not need spillovers of adaptation
benefits.
The major conclusion that we can draw from our results is that private adaptive investments
to counteract the adverse consequences of climate change should be incorporated into IEAs, as this
would enhance their stability and improve the overall welfare of all countries, provided that the
adaptive measures considered in such agreements require commitments and investments prior to
mitigation decisions.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Impact of a player’s adaptation on the mitigation game solution
1. M-agreement and C-agreement
(a) Impact of a non-signatory country’s adaptation
i. on total emission:
d
daj
(
n+ ωAI + ωaj +N
2ωa¯S
W1
)
=
ω
W1
ii. on its own mitigation level:
d
daj
ω (E − aj) = ω
W1
(ω −W1) < 0
iii. on other non-signatories’ mitigation level:
d
daj
ω (E − ai) = ω
2
W1
> 0
iv. on signatories’ mitigation level:
d
daj
Nω (E − ai) = N ω
2
W1
> 0.
(b) Impact of a signatory country’s adaptation
i. on total emissions:
d
daj
(
n+Mωa¯I +Nω (AS + aj)
W1
)
=
Nω
W1
ii. on its own mitigation level:
d
daj
(Nω (E − aj)) = NωNω −W1
W1
< 0
iii. on other signatories’ mitigation level:
d
daj
Nω (E − ai) = N2 ω
2
W1
> 0
iv. on non-signatories’ mitigation level:
d
daj
ω (E − ai) = N ω
2
W1
> 0.
2. A-agreement
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(a) For both signatories and non signatories, the impact of a single country’s adaptation on
total emission is ωW2 .
(b) Impact of a signatory or non-signatory country’s adaptation
i. on its own mitigation level:
d
daj
ω (E − aj) = ωω −W2
W2
< 0
ii. on other countries’ mitigation level:
d
daj
ω (E − ai) = ω
2
W2
> 0.
8.2 Summary results
This table summarizes the impact of adaptation on total emissions and on mitigation levels for
both kind of countries and for three possible agreements when vI = vS = v.
Non signatories Signatories
M-agreement
dE
daI
= ωW1
dE
daS
= NωW1
mI = ωv mS = Nωv
dmI
daI
= ω ω−W1W1
dmS
daS
= NωNω−W1W1
A-agreement
dE
daI
= ωW2
dE
daS
= NωW2
mI = ωv mS = ωv
dmI
daI
= ω ω−W2W2
dmS
daS
= ωNω−W2W2
C-agreement
dE
daI
= ωW1
dE
daS
= ωN
2
W1
mI = ωv mS = Nωv
dmI
daI
= ω ω−W1W1
dmS
daS
= Nω−W1+N
2ω
W1
8.3 Proof of Proposition 1
For a given player i ∈ S, define θi ≡ a¯S − ai and
Ψi = c
S
i (N)− cIi (N − 1)
=
1
2
ω (E1 − ai)2 − 1
2
ω (E2 − ai)2 + 1
2
N2ω2 (E1 − a¯S)2 − 1
2
ω2 (E2 − ai)2 .
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The internal stability condition for a given coalition of size N is then Ψi ≤ 0 for all i ∈ S. We then
have
E1 =
n+Mωa¯I +N
2ωa¯S
ωN2 +Mω + 1
E2 =
W1E1 − ωai (N − 2)−Nω (θi + ai)
W1 − 2ω (N − 1)
Ψi =
1
2
ω (E1 − ai)2
−1
2
ω
(
W1E1 − ωai (N − 2)−Nω (θi + ai)
W1 − 2ω (N − 1) − ai
)2
+
1
2
N2ω2 (E1 − (θi + ai))2
−1
2
ω2
(
W1E1 − ωai (N − 2)−Nω (θi + ai)
W1 − 2ω (N − 1) − ai
)2
. (22)
Rearranging Equation (22) yields
Ψi =
N2ω2
2 (W1 − 2ω (N − 1))2
K7θ
2
i
− Nω
2 (E1 − ai)
(W1 − 2ω (N − 1))2
K8θi
+
ω2 (E1 − ai)2 (N − 1)
2 (W1 − 2ω (N − 1))2
K9
where
K7 = ω
2 (M +N (N − 2) + 1) (M +N (N − 2) + 3)
+ω (2M + 2N (N − 2) + 3) + 1
K8 = ω
2
(
NM2 +M
(
4N + 2N2 (N − 2)− 1)+N (N − 1) (5N +N2 (N − 3)− 4))
+ω (2N − 1)
(
M + (N − 1)2
)
+ (N − 1)
K9 = ω
2 (M +N (N − 2)) (M +N (M + 2) +N2 (N − 1))
+2ω
(
(N − 1) (M + 2) +N2 (N − 3))+ (N − 3) .
Note that the three constants K7, K8 and K9 are strictly positive for N ≥ 3. Ψi is a convex
quadratic function of θi that is decreasing and positive at θi = 0. As a consequence, for N ≥ 3,
Ψi > 0 when θi ≤ 0. Recall that the stability condition requires that Ψi ≤ 0 for all i ∈ S. As a
consequence, for a coalition of N ≥ 3 players, it suffices to show that there exists at least one i ∈ S
for which θi ≤ 0 to obtain that the coalition is not stable. We distinguish two cases:
i) If all signatories have the same adaptation level (symmetric case), θi = 0 and Ψi > 0 for all
i ∈ S when N ≥ 3. All signatories would benefit from leaving the agreement, and we conclude
that no coalition of N ≥ 3 countries is stable when they have the same adaptation level.
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ii) If signatories have different adaptation levels (asymmetric case), then there exists at least one
signatory country adapting more than the average aS , say country j. For that country, θj < 0
and, if N ≥ 3, Ψj > 0. Country j would benefit from leaving the agreement and we conclude
that no coalition of N ≥ 3 countries is stable when they have different adaptation levels.
8.4 Numerical values used in figures
Figure 2
A-agreement, n = 100
γD
γM
0.006 0.02 0.1 0.39 1.6 6.25 25 100
γD
γA
Stable coalition size
156 5 11 33 70 89 96 99 100
312 5 11 34 76 93 98 99 100
625 5 12 34 80 96 99 100 100
1250 5 12 34 82 98 99 100 100
2500 5 12 34 84 99 100 100 100
5000 5 12 34 85 99 100 100 100
Figure 3
A-agreement, n = 50
γD
γM
0.006 0.02 0.1 0.39 1.6 6.25 25 100
γD
γA
Stable coalition size
156 6 10 18 32 43 47 49 49
312 6 10 19 33 45 48 49 50
625 6 10 19 34 47 49 50 50
1250 6 10 19 34 48 49 50 50
2500 6 10 19 34 48 50 50 50
5000 6 10 19 34 48 50 50 50
Figure 4
C-agreement, n = 100
γD
γM
0.006 0.02 0.1 0.39 1.6 6.25 25 100
γD
γA
Stable coalition size
156 2 2 2 58 85 96 99 100
312 2 2 2 66 91 98 99 100
625 2 2 2 72 95 99 100 100
1250 2 2 2 77 97 99 100 100
2500 2 2 2 80 98 100 100 100
5000 2 2 2 82 99 100 100 100
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Figure 5
C-agreement, n = 50
γD
γM
0.006 0.02 0.1 0.39 1.6 6.25 25 100
γD
γA
Stable coalition size
156 2 2 2 25 39 46 48 49
312 2 2 2 28 42 47 49 50
625 2 2 2 30 45 49 50 50
1250 2 2 2 31 46 49 50 50
2500 2 2 2 31 47 50 50 50
5000 2 2 2 31 48 50 50 50
Figure 7
A-agreement, n = 100
γD
γM
0.006 0.02 0.1 0.39 1.6 6.25 25 100
γD
γA
% reduction in total cost w.r.t. no-cooperation
156 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.323 0.862 0.981 0.998 1.000
312 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.268 0.852 0.983 0.996 0.999
625 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.195 0.833 0.979 0.997 0.999
1250 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.122 0.802 0.956 0.994 0.999
2500 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.075 0.732 0.953 0.989 0.997
5000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.042 0.566 0.912 0.979 0.995
C-agreement, n = 100
γD
γM
0.006 0.02 0.1 0.39 1.6 6.25 25 100
γD
γA
% reduction in total cost w.r.t. no-cooperation
156 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.420 0.867 0.984 0.998 1.000
312 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.394 0.882 0.986 0.996 0.999
625 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.327 0.879 0.982 0.997 0.999
1250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.252 0.842 0.963 0.994 0.999
2500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.170 0.766 0.959 0.989 0.997
5000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.689 0.923 0.980 0.995
Figure 8
A-agreement, n = 100
γD
γM
0.006 0.02 0.1 0.39 1.6 6.25 25 100
γD
γA
% reduction in total pollution w.r.t. no-cooperation
156 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.183 0.650 0.885 0.972 1.000
312 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.150 0.644 0.904 0.956 0.999
625 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.108 0.635 0.909 0.997 0.999
1250 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.067 0.626 0.844 0.994 0.999
2500 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.040 0.585 0.953 0.989 0.997
5000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.417 0.912 0.979 0.995
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C-agreement, n = 100
γD
γM
0.006 0.02 0.1 0.39 1.6 6.25 25 100
γD
γA
% reduction in total pollution w.r.t. no-cooperation
156 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.245 0.653 0.898 0.974 1.000
312 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.229 0.682 0.916 0.958 1.000
625 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.187 0.692 0.922 0.997 0.999
1250 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.142 0.658 0.862 0.995 0.999
2500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.583 0.960 0.990 0.997
5000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.539 0.925 0.980 0.995
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